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In this letter we propose a theoretical deterministic secure direct bidirectional quantum
communication protocol by using swapping quantum entanglement and local unitary
operations, in which the quantum channel for photon transmission can be discarded,
hence any attack with or without eavesdropping or even the destructive attack without
scruple is impossible.
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Much attention [1-6] has been focused on the study of the quantum key distribution (QKD)
after the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [7], for the shared QKD can
be used to encrypt the secret messages which is sent through a classical channel. As a matter
of fact, the deterministic secure direct communication is more attractive and usually desired due
to its obvious convenience. However, because of its more demanding on the security than QKDs,
a proposal of a deterministic secure direct communication protocol is usually quite difficult. Till
the end of 2003, only three deterministic deterministic secure direct communication protocols had
been proposed by using the quantum entanglement of a photon pair [4-6]. Moreover, recently
Zhang et al has proposed another deterministic secure direct communication protocol by using
the quantum entanglement swapping of two photon pairs [8]. These four protocols mentioned
are all message-unilaterally-transmitted protocols. Very recently, inspired by the deterministic
secure direct protocol (i.e., the ping-pong protocol) proposed by Bostro¨m and Felbinger [5], a de-
terministic secure direct bidirectional simultaneous communication protocol is proposed by Zhang
et al in a subtle way [9]. This is the first bidirectional secure quantum communication protocol.
After this, according to the subtle idea presented in [9] the improvement on the two-step secure
communication protocol [6] is also finished [10]. Hence, to our best knowledge, there are only six
deterministic secure direct communication protocols so far. These protocols (except for the one
in [8]) have four common properties as follows. (a) In all the protocols, after the message sender’s
encoding by unitary operation on the photon, the photon must be transmitted form the message
sender’s side to the message receiver’s side via a quantum channel. This offers opportunities for
the hostile person to eavesdrop or to attack the secret messages. (b) All the protocols are es-
sentially quasisecure. Alternatively, the eavesdropping can not be detected with a possibility of
100%. As a result, a part of information might be leaked to the eavesdropper. (c) All the pro-
tocols are insecure under the attack without eavesdropping [11]. Hence, a strategy like message
authentification should be adopted to detect such attacks. (d) In the cases that an eavesdropper
is detected or an attacker attacks the quantum channel of photon transmission without scruple,
2the secure communication has to be aborted. In fact, such cases occur quite possibly during some
special times like a war. We think, all these are the common faults of the protocols, especially (d)
is fatal. By the way, since a quantum channel for photon transmission should also be included in
the protocol in [8], (d) is also the protocol’s fault. In this letter, taking advantage of the idea of
using the quantum entanglement swapping of two photon pairs [8] and the subtle idea presented
in [9] to realize the bidirectional communication, we further propose another deterministic secure
direct bidirectional simultaneous communication protocol, however, in which the quantum chan-
nel of photon transmission can be discarded, any attack with or without eavesdropping and even
the destructive attack without scruple are accordingly impossible, hence this protocol is perfectly
secure and can work in any case provided that the resource of the message carriers is sufficient.
Consequently, this protocol will be very attractive in the commercial and military aspects due to
its outstanding advantages.
Let us first describe the quantum entanglement swapping [12-14] simply. Let |0〉 and |1〉 be the
horizontal and vertical polarization states of a photon, respectively. Then the four Bell states,
|Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2 and |Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2, are maximally entangled states in the
two-photon Hilbert space. Let the initial state of two photon pairs (i.e., the photon a1 and b1 pair
and the photon a2 and b2 pair) be the product of any two of the four Bell states, such as |Ψ+a1b1〉
and |Ψ+
a2b2
〉, then after the Bell state measurements on the photon a1 and a2 pair and the photon
b1 and b2 pair, since the following equation holds,
|Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Ψ+
a2b2
〉 = 1
2
(|Ψ+a1a2〉|Ψ+b1b2〉 − |Ψ−a1a2〉|Ψ−b1b2〉+ |Φ+a1a2〉|Φ+b1b2〉 − |Φ−a1a2〉|Φ−b1b2〉), (1)
the total initial state (i.e., |Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Ψ+
a2b2
〉) is projected onto |η1〉 = |Φ+a1a2〉 ⊗ |Φ+b1b2〉, |η2〉 =
|Φ−a1a2〉⊗|Φ−b1b2〉, |η3〉 = |Ψ+a1a2〉⊗|Ψ+24〉 and |η4〉 = |Ψ−a1a2〉⊗|Ψ−b1b2〉 with equal probability of 14 for
each. It is seen that previous entanglements between photons a1 and b1, and a2 and b2, are now
swapped into the entanglements between photons a1 and a2, and b1 and b2. Therefore, if |Φ+a1a2〉
is obtained by the Bell state measurements, |Φ+
b1b2
〉 should be gained inevitably by the Bell state
measurements; if |Φ−a1a2〉 is obtained, then |Φ−b1b2〉 is arrived at; and so on. This means that for a
known initial state the Bell state measurement results after the quantum entanglement swapping
are correlated. In the above example |Ψ+
a1b1
〉⊗|Ψ+
a2b2
〉 is chosen as the initial state. In fact, similar
results can also be arrived at provided that other choices of the initial states are given. As can be
seen as follows:


|Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Ψ−
a2b2
〉 = 1
2
(|Ψ+a1a2〉|Ψ−b1b2〉 − |Ψ−a1a2〉|Ψ+b1b2〉 − |Φ+a1a2〉|Φ−b1b2〉+ |Φ−a1a2〉|Φ+b1b2〉),
|Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Φ+
a2b2
〉 = 1
2
(|Ψ+a1a2〉|Φ+b1b2〉 − |Ψ−a1a2〉|Φ−b1b2〉+ |Φ+a1a2〉|Ψ+b1b2〉 − |Φ−a1a2〉|Ψ−b1b2〉),
|Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Φ−
a2b2
〉 = 1
2
(|Ψ+a1a2〉|Φ−b1b2〉 − |Ψ−a1a2〉|Φ+b1b2〉 − |Φ+a1a2〉|Ψ−b1b2〉+ |Φ−a1a2〉|Ψ+b1b2〉).
(2)
By the way, for the above four known initial states the correlation of the Bell state measurement
results after the quantum entanglement swapping is very useful. On the other hand, it should
also be noted that different results by the Bell state measurements correspond to different initial
states for the above four known initial states. For examples, when |Ψ+a1a2〉 and |Ψ−b1b2〉 are obtained
by the Bell state measurements, the initial state should be |Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Ψ−
a2b2
〉; when |Φ+a1a2〉 and
|Ψ−
b1b2
〉 are obtained by the Bell state measurements, the initial state should be |Ψ+
a1b1
〉 ⊗ |Φ−
a2b2
〉;
and so on. Incidentally, this property is used in our communication protocol. In addition, it
3is easily verified that, the four Bell states can be transformed into each other by some unitary
operations, which can be performed locally with nonlocal effects. For examples: Let u0 = |0〉〈0|+
|1〉〈1|, u1 = |1〉〈1| − |0〉〈0|, u2 = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|, u3 = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|, then |Ψ+a2b2〉 will be in
turn transformed into |Ψ+
a2b2
〉, |Ψ−
a2b2
〉, |Φ+
a2b2
〉, |Φ−
a2b2
〉 after the unitary operations u0, u1, u2, u3
on anyone photon (say, the b2 photon) of the pair, respectively, that is, u0|Ψ+a2b2〉 = |Ψ+a2b2〉,
u1|Ψ+a2b2〉 = |Ψ−a2b2〉, u2|Ψ+a2b2〉 = |Φ+a2b2〉 and u3|Ψ+a2b2〉 = |Φ−a2b2〉. Assume that each of the above
four unitary operations corresponds to a two-bit encoding respectively, i.e., u0 to ’00’, u1 to ’01’,
u2 to ’10’ and u3 to ’11’. Then, taking advantage of the quantum entanglement swapping and
the assumption of the two-bit codings, a deterministic secure direct bidirectional communication
protocol can be proposed. We show it later.
Alice prepares an ordered N EPR photon pairs in state |Ψ〉ab = |Ψ+〉 = (|0〉a|1〉b+ |1〉a|0〉b)/
√
2
for each and divides them into two partner-photon sequences [a1, a2, . . . , aN ] and [b1, b2, . . . , bN ],
where ai (bi) stands for the a (b) photon in the ith photon pair. Then Bob securely takes the b
photon sequence away as a storage for the future use. By the way, as for how Bob can securely
take the b photon sequence away as a storage, in principle, it is possible in theory. Maybe Bob
can use some materials [15-16] to store the photons and take it away just as a baggage. Maybe
the photons can be transmitted through a fiber to Bob’s storage during the peaceful and secure
times. In addition, how to maintain the entanglement properties of the photon pair is also a
question. However, all these are only technological or other theoretical problems [17-18] and
beyond our present theoretical scope. Whenever Alice and Bob want to communicate secretly
with each other (if they want, they can publicly announce), they can do as follows. Both Alice
and Bob perform the unitary operations on the photons with even (or odd) orders in their hands
according to their secret messages. For examples, when Alice wants to let Bob securely know
her bit string ’011110. . . ’, according to her bit string she performs u1, u3, u2 on the a2, a4 and
a6 photons respectively, and so on. When Bob wants to let Alice securely know his bit string
’101100. . . ’, she performs u2, u3, u0 on the b2, b4 and b6 photons respectively, and so on. After
their unitary operations they perform their Bell state measurements and publicly announces their
results. That is, Alice performs in turn her Bell state measurements on the photon a1 and a2
pair, the photon a3 and a4 pair, etc, and publicly announce the measurement results in order;
Similarly, Bob performs in turn his Bell state measurements on the photon b1 and b2 pair, the
photon b3 and b4 pair, etc, and publicly announces the measurement results in order. Since Alice
(Bob) knows which unitary operations she (he) has performed, then according to Bob’s (Alice’s)
measurement results publicly announced and her (his) measurement results, she (he) can conclude
Bob’s (Alice’s) unitary operations and accordingly extract Bob’s (Alice’s) bit string (See Table 1).
So far a deterministic direct bidirectional communication has been proposed. By the way, if one
party has no secret message to communicate, she or he can have two choices. One is that she or he
only performs the unitary operations randomly to prevent from Eve’s eavesdropping. The other
choice is that, she ( or he) publicly tells the partner that she (or he) has no secret message, then she
(or he) does not perform any unitary operations and does not publicly announce the measurement
results anymore. In any case of the above two choices, the communication protocol is reduced to
a deterministic secure direct message-unilaterally-transmitted communication protocol.
4Since Bob has taken securely the b photon sequence away and the a photon sequence is in Alice’s
hand, Eve (the eavesdropper) has no access to any photons, hence she can neither attack nor eaves-
drop the secret messages. Therefore, the present deterministic direct bidirectional communication
protocol is secure. In all protocols mentioned in this letter, the message carrier is photon. In all
the other protocols except for [8], the photon encoded (i.e., performed a local unitary operation)
has to be transmitted to the receiver to be performed a local Bell state measurement of the photon
pair, hence the message transmission is essentially local. While in the present protocol, since the
quantum entanglement swapping of two photon pairs is employed, the photons encoded need not
to be transmitted via a quantum channel anymore, hence the message transmission is essentially
nonlocal. It is this nonlocality which leads to the nonattackable property of the present protocol.
This is the essential difference between the present protocol and other protocols. Incidentally,
though in the present protocol the photon is chosen as the message carrier, the idea of the present
protocol is a general one, hence it should also be suitable for other message carriers. Recently,
the experimental achievement of Bose-Einstein condensates has attracted many attentions. It is
reported that the entangles states of pairs of atoms can be created and the coherent transporta-
tion of the neutral atoms can be achieved in the optical lattices [19-20]. Maybe an alternative
experimental demonstration of the present protocol by using the quantum entanglement swapping
of the entangled atom pairs is feasible in the near future.
In summary, we have proposed a theoretical deterministic secure direct bidirectional quantum
communication protocol by using swapping quantum entanglement and local unitary operations,
in which the quantum channel for photon transmission can be discarded, hence any attack is
impossible and accordingly the present protocol is perfectly secure.
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.
10304022.
Table 1. Corresponding relations among Bob’s and Alice’s Bell state measurement
results, the corresponding states before measurements and Bob’s and Alice’s
unitary u operations (i.e., the encoding bits).{
Φ+a1a2 ,Φ
+
b1b2
} {
Ψ−a1a2 ,Ψ
+
b1b2
} {
Ψ+a1a2 ,Φ
+
b1b2
} {
Ψ+a1a2 ,Φ
−
b1b2
}
{
Ψ−a1a2 ,Ψ
−
b1b2
} {
Φ+a1a2 ,Φ
−
b1b2
} {
Ψ−a1a2 ,Φ
−
b1b2
} {
Ψ−a1a2 ,Φ
+
b1b2
}
{
Ψ+a1a2 ,Ψ
+
b1b2
} {
Φ−a1a2 ,Φ
+
b1b2
} {
Φ+a1a2 ,Ψ
+
b1b2
} {
Φ+a1a2 ,Ψ
−
b1b2
}
{
Φ−a1a2 ,Φ
−
b1b2
} {
Ψ+a1a2 ,Ψ
−
b1b2
} {
Φ−a1a2 ,Ψ
−
b1b2
} {
Φ−a1a2 ,Ψ
+
b1b2
}
Ψ+
a1b1
⊗Ψ+
a2b2
Ψ+
a1b1
⊗Ψ−
a2b2
Ψ+
a1b1
⊗ Φ+
a2b2
Ψ+
a1b1
⊗ Φ−
a2b2
{uA0 (00), uB0 (00)} {uA1 (01), uB0 (00)} {uA2 (10), uB0 (00)} {uA3 (11), uB0 (00)}
{uA1 (00), uB1 (00)} {uA0 (00), uB1 (01)} {uA0 (00), uB2 (10)} {uA0 (00), uB3 (11)}
{uA2 (00), uB2 (00)} {uA2 (10), uB3 (11)} {uA1 (01), uB3 (11)} {uA1 (01), uB2 (10)}
{uA3 (00), uB3 (00)} {uA3 (11), uB2 (10)} {uA3 (11), uB1 (01)} {uA2 (10), uB1 (01)}
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